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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SUSPENSION 
ORDERS UNDER THE FEDERAL 
INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND 
RODENTICIDE ACT: NOR-AM 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, 
INC. V. HARDINt 
By Edward A. Haffer':' 
In or about August, 1969, a New Mexico hog raiser secured 
waste grain products and fed them to approximately seventeen of 
his hogs. The grain was noxious with fungicides containing mer-
cury. After a one month period during which the hogs were fed 
the grain, one hog apparently became ill. The animal was butch-
ered, and from September through December its meat was con-
sumed by seven of the nine members of the raiser's family. Four-
teen more hogs revealed abnormalities during October; two 
eventually became blind and twelve died. By December, three 
of the family members who had eaten the first hog were suffering 
from permanent injuries caused by mercury poisoning. 
Plaintiffs are Nor-Am Agricultural Products, Inc., and Morton 
International, Inc., who are respectively the seller and manufac-
turer of Panogen. Panogen is used for agricultural seed treatment 
and contains mercury compounds. The product has been mar-
keted .since 1949.2 Farmers have used Panogen as a fungicide to 
protect seedlings of oats, tomatoes, wheat, barley and other re-
lated crops from soil-borne fungi diseases as well as from diseases 
which pass from generation to generation. Use of mercury prod-
ucts in seed treatment has proved economical as well as effective. 
It is estimated that in the twenty year period which began in 
1949, more than eight billion dollars accrued to farmers as a 
result of the higher crop yields made possible by such treat-
ment.3 National sales of Panogen alone total approximately 
$4,000 per day.4 The district court in Nor-Am heard testimony 
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to the effect that "there was no available satisfactory substitute 
for liquid methylmercury seed treatment products (including 
Panogen) which is as economical and efficacious for the treat-
men t of seeds. "6 
The Panogen products were registered in accordance with the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).6 
All items conformed to such requirements as the display of a red-
letter label which read "poison-treated,"7 a skull-and-crossbones,8 
and a warning against the use of Panogen-treated seed for feed, 
oil, or food. 9 In addition to the warnings on the label, the product 
itself was dyed red in order to prevent any misuse of the treated 
seed. 
On February 18, 1970, the day after national news coveragelO 
of the New Mexico tragedy, Doctor Harry W. Hays, Director of 
the Pesticides Regulation Division of the Departmen t of Agri-
culture, sent a telegram to Nor-Am as notification that Panogen's 
registration was suspended and that subsequent distributions 
were to be unlawfulY In a letter confirming the telegram, Doctor 
Hays stated that the labeling ofPanogen did not adequately keep 
the product from harmful contact with the public.12 The suspen-
sion was deemed necessary "to prevent an imminent hazard to 
the public." 13 Other incidents that involved damage from mer-
cury based fungicides were men tioned to the plain tiffs. Toward 
the end of March, the anti-distribution order was extended to 
Nor-Am's competitors.l4 
Plaintiffs sought relief at the district court, and were granted a 
preliminary injunction which enjoined the Secretary and subordi-
nate personnel from interfering with the distribution or manu-
facture of Panogen.15 During the trial, Doctor Hays was ques-
tioned as to the basis for the suspension order. He stated that he 
knew of no permanent injury resulting from the use of Panogen 
per se.16 He further stated that he had issued the suspension order 
on the assumption that the product involved at New Mexico was 
Panogen. Although Doctor Hays believed that tests did exist 
which would have positively identified the harmful substance as 
Panogen, he admitted that the tests had not been used. With re-
gard to other incidents which had influenced the decision to sus-
pend, Hays discussed events which had taken place in Oregon 
and California. It evolved, however, that neither of the incidents 
was so adequately documented as to support the decision to sus-
pend Panogen's registrationY 
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The Secretary of Agriculture appealed the district court's in-
junction to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.IS The 
court of appeals stayed the preliminary injunction and ordered 
an expedited disposition of the appeal. Affirming the lower court's 
decision, the three judge court held that the Secretary's order, 
based on a single incident and rendered without an administra-
tive hearing, was arbitrary and capricious.19 Judicial review, 
though at an early juncture, was timely because the order 
amounted to a final determination of the issue of an imminent 
hazard to the public.20 
Justice Cummings, in the dissent, examined the legislative his-
tory of the FIFRA. He concluded that the suspension order was 
not intended by Congress to be "final agency action," and that 
judicial review therefore was not appropriate at that point in 
time.21 Justice Cummings also stated that because there had not 
been an expedited agency hearing as provided by the FIFRA, 
the administrative processes were not exhausted;22 this fact 
further militated against judicial review. 
This note submits that the Secretary's order was authorized by 
the statute and that judicial review prior to an administrative 
hearing was not appropriate.23 The conclusion of the court of 
appeals in Nor-Am defies the congressional intent underlying the 
FIFRA and is not supported by the principal case law. 
The FIFRA establishes standards for the marketing of pesti-
cides and is administered by the Secretary of Agriculture.24 Under 
the Act, all such pesticides, or "economic poisons," must meet 
certain safety and labeling standards. If a product does not 
meet the standards, the Secretary may refuse to register it; or, 
in the event the product has already been registered, he may can-
cel its registration.25 Lack or loss of registration means that the 
pesticide cannot be legally distributed.26 Prior to actual cancella-
tion, but after a registrant has received notice of the Secretary's 
intent to cancel, a registrant has thirty days to conform to the 
labeling standards or to petition for a committee referral or a 
public hearing.27 If he chooses to petition, the matter may require 
more than a year for final resolution.28 Since such a delay might 
endanger public health, Congress has given the Secretary emer-
gency suspension power. 29 The single condition upon which this 
power may be exercised is that the Secretary find it "necessary 
to prevent an imminent hazard to the public." 30 Joined with the 
suspension provision is a provision which affords the registrant 
the opportunity to have an expedited administrative hearing on 
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the decision to suspend.3! The Act also allows for judicial review 
of these administrative actions.32 
The majority in Nor-Am substantially ignored the legislative 
history of the 1964 FIFRA amendments,33 even though these 
amendments contained the provisions critical to the case at bar. 
Prior to the amendments, the FIFRA provided for "registration 
under protest."34 This meant that if a poison did not appear to 
the Secretary to comply with the requirements of the Act, and 
if its producer nonetheless insisted on registration, the Secretary 
was bound to register it, although he then did so "under pro-
test." 35 The resigtrant was thereby protected against the sanc-
tions imposed for failure to register.36 It was not, however, simul-
taneously sheltered from other penalties, i.e., those applied when 
non-compliance was actually verified.37 What follows is an ex-
planation of the legislative history of the 1964 FIFRA amend-
ments: 
The principal effect of registration under protest [was] to shift the 
burden of proof from the registrant to the Government. If the prod-
uct [was] not registered, the penalty or seizure provisions [could] be 
applied on that ground. If it [was] registered under protest, the 
Government [had] the burden of proving that the product [did] not 
comply with the act. 
Thus, ... the Secretary [could] be required to register a product 
even though he [was] convinced that it [was] ineffective and danger-
ous to human life .... The [amendment] correct[s] this situation and 
afford[s] greater protection to the public by repealing the authority for 
registration under protest. In its place the [amendment] provides 
that applicants dissatisfied with the Secretary's action in refusing 
or canceling registration may have recourse to advisory committee 
proceedings, public hearings and euentually judicial review. Thus 
the [amendment] affords adequate protection to the public, and pro-
tects applicants for registration from arbitrary or ill-advised action 
by the Department. (Emphasis added.)38 
The use of the word "eventually" suggests a congressional in-
tent that the registrant or applicant follow administrative 
avenues before seeking judicial review. This interpretation might 
be challenged, however, on the basis of apparent discrepancies 
between the wording of §4C39 of the FIFRA and that of §4d.40 
Section 4c, after inter alia authorizing suspension orders, states 
that the Secretary 
shall give the registrant prompt notice of such action and afford the 
registrant the opportunity to have the matter submitted to an ad-
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visory committee and for an expedited hearing under this section. 
Final orders of the Secretary under this section shall be subject to 
judicial review, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (d) 
of this section. (Emphasis added.)41 
But subsection (d) states: 
In a case of actual controversy as to the validity of any order under 
this section, any person who will be adversely affected by such order 
may obtain judicial review by filing in the United States court of 
appeals for the circuit wherein such person resides or has his princi-
pal place of business ... within sixty days after the entry of such 
order, a petition praying that the order be set aside in whole or in 
part. (Emphasis added.)42 
Subsection (c)'s referral to the provisions of subsection (d) 
might be taken to mean that the words "any order" should con-
trol over the words "final order" in determining the point at 
which judicial review is timely. The opposite conclusion, however, 
seems to be more reasonable. Subsection Cd) further provides that 
"[t]he findings of the Secretary with respect to questions of fact 
shall be sustained if supported by substantial evidence when con-
sidered on the record as a whole, including any report and recom-
mendation of an advisory committee." (Emphasis added.)43 The 
word "record" appears twice in subsection (c), and in each in-
stance it refers to the collection of data at a hearing.44 It would 
seem then that subsection (d) presumes that hearing records will 
be available at the time of judicial review. If so, the judicial 
intrusion in Nor-Am was premature.46 
As indicated above, Congress, in the 1964 amendments, in-
tended to shift the burden of proof from the governmen t to the 
registrant. 46 The court in Nor-Am, however, does not appear to 
have realized the new distribution of burdens. The court's error 
is implicit in the following statement: 
[T]he position of the Department seems to be that as long as the 
products are on the market no warning whatsoever can be conceived 
which would be adequate warning. This, of course, as a general prop-
osition could be said to be true of any poisonous substance which 
has economic usefulness in the daily affairs of lifeY 
The court thus seemed to assume that the Secretary was required 
to demonstrate the labeling's inadequacy. Since, however, the 
burden of proof should have been on the registrant, it was incum-
bent on that party to show that the Secretary was not entitled 
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to invoke suspension. Specifically, the registrant had to show that 
the Secretary was not in a position to "[find] that such [immedi-
ate] action [was] necessary to prevent an imminent hazard to the 
public." 48 As discussed below,49 the words "imminent hazard" 
denote a foreboding, as opposed to a realization, of extensive 
injury. The choice of the word "immediately" indicates that ex-
tensive deliberation is not required and underscores the need for 
quick action. The use of the word "find," as even the Nor-Am 
majority indicated,50 does not imply a prerequisite of fact-finding 
bodies or organized hearings, but refers only to the Secretary's 
observation of facts; he is to be guided by his own reasonable per-
ceptions. Thus the statute is designed to encourage the exercise 
of departmental discretion. It would seem to follow that even if 
the judicial intrusion in Nor-Am had been timely, the registrant 
would have borne an unusually difficult burden of proof. The 
language of §4c suggests that the Secretary was well within his 
expansive discretionary authority in issuing a suspension order 
based on nothing more than the Alamogordo incident. 
In summary, on the basis of the statute alone, the Nor-Am 
court would appear to have erred in two respects. First, it was in 
error for not having reckoned with the congressional intent that 
the suspension order not be treated as final agency action. And 
second, even if its intervention had been timely, the Secretary's 
order would seem to have been clearly justifiable under the sta-
tute, thus making the registrant's burden in Nor-Am impossible 
to bear. The dissent in Nor-Am aptly responds to the court's 
misin terpreta tion of the FIFRA: 
The rule that administrative remedies may be by-passed only 
when inadequate to protect strong private interest from irreparable 
harm "is not one of mere convenience or ready application. Where 
the intent of Congress is clear to require administrative determina-
tion, either to the exclusion of judicial action or in advance of it, a 
strong showing is required, both of inadequacy of the prescribed 
procedure and of impending harm, to permit short-circuiting the 
administrative process. Congress' commands for jUdicial restraint 
in this respect are not lightly to be disregarded."51 
Having substantially overlooked the legislative history of the 
FIFRA, the court attempted to base its holding on a reading of 
the germane case law. It is submitted that none of the cases sup-
port the court's position and that they in fact undermine it. 
In deciding that the Department's suspension order repre-
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sen ted final agency action on the issue of imminen t hazard to the 
public, the Nor-Am majority described Abbott Laboratories v. 
Gardner62 as the case which was "most analogous and persuasive 
in our opinion."63 The Abbott controversy involved a 1962 amend-
ment64 to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA).66 
The amendment required that the labels and the advertising of 
prescription drugs reveal the "established" name of each drug 
"prominently and in type at least half as large as that" 56 pro-
vided for the brand name. Regulations subsequently promulgated 
by the Food and Drug Administration construed the statute to 
mean that "every time" the brand name appeared, the estab-
lished name had to appear also.67 Abbott Laboratories and other 
producers petitioned a federal district court58 for a declaratory 
judgment. They argued that the "every time" interpretation was 
not permitted by the statute, and that as a result the regulations 
should be declared null and void. The court agreed with the 
plaintiffs and enjoined enforcement of the regulations. On appeal, 
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit69 held that under the 
circumstances Judicial review by the district court was not au-
thorized under either the FFDCA or the Administrative Proce-
dure Act.60 The third circuit was in turn reversed by the United 
States Supreme Court, which found judicial review appropriate. G1 
Abbott was then remanded for a consideration of the district 
court's conclusion on the merits.62 
It is submitted that the court in Nor-Am misapplied Abbott. 
The Nor-Am court did acknowledge two distinctions between the 
cases but failed to recognize their importance. One distinction 
was the nature of the relevant statues in each case.63 The FFDCA 
provides that administrative remedies are in addition to, rather 
than in substitution for, other remedies available at law;64 thus a 
complainant thereunder may clearly have an option to early 
judicial review. The FIFRA by contrast has no such provision;65 
however, it also fails to specify exclusive jurisdiction for the 
agency. The court in Nor-Am therefore concluded that although 
the Act did not explicitly sanction its intercession, it likewise 
imposed no obstacle.66 It felt that it could follow the lead of Abbott 
and intervene. As discussed above, however, equivalent congres-
sional sentiments are not at work in the FIFRA and FFDCA. 
Because of the less permissive spirit of the FIFRA provision, 
the court did not have the latitude of the Abbott Court in evaluat-
ing jurisdiction to review. 
A second distinction stressed by the court was the breadth of 
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the regulations or order in each case.67 The regulations contested 
in Abbott were to affect the entire prescription-drug producing 
industry. The Nor-Am order, on the other hand, was particu-
larized to a specific manufacturer within a given industry. The 
court is of little help in describing what importance should be 
ascribed to the fact that the order was particularized. At one 
point, the court seems to suggest that since particularized orders 
are not industry-wide, they are more susceptible to arbitrary and 
capricious applications and thus more in need of early judicial 
review.68 However, since the Nor-Am order had been extended 
to Nor-Am's competitors one month after its original issuance,69 
the court's suggestion seems ill-founded. At another point, the 
court states that the lack of a particularized order in Abbott was a 
critical part of Justice Fortas' dissent in that case,7° and implies 
that Justice Fortas would have favored judicial review in cases 
which did contain such orders (e.g., Nor-Am).71 It is submitted 
that the court misinterpreted Justice Fortas' dissent in two re-
spects. It was not the lack of a particularized "order," but the 
lack of a particularized "setting"72 that had been discussed by 
Justice Fortas. Moreover, Justice Fortas' dissent in Abbott did 
not turn solely on the presence or absence of a particularized 
setting. It seems that he considered the congressional intent be-
hind the pertinent legislation an even more important factor: 
The Court seems to announce a doctrine, which is new and startling 
in administrative law, that the courts, in determining whether to 
exercise jurisdiction by injunction, will not look to see whether 
Congress intended that the parties should resort to another avenue 
of review, but will be governed by whether Congress has "prohibited" 
injunctive relief.73 
As the Nor-Am court itself noted, the terms of the FIFRA are 
not as amenable to early judicial review as the statutory language 
considered in Abbott.74 It would seem then that despite the pres-
ence of a particularized setting in Nor-Am, the nature of the 
FIFRA would have demanded an even greater measure of the 
judicial restraint which Justice Fortas had advocated. 
Two more distinctions between Nor-Am and Abbott, not men-
tioned by the majority in Nor-Am, should be noted. One is that 
Nor-Am is an enforcement case while Abbott is a pre-enforcement 
case. 76 The Court in Abbott examined newly promulgated, but not 
yet enforced, regulations which were the culmination of the 
agency's legislative processes. The court in Nor-Am, on the other 
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hand, reviewed a statutorily authorized suspension order, which 
signalled only the commencement of agency action. At issue in 
Abbott was the validity of regulations; once the matters of juris-
diction and existence of a real controversy were settled, the 
Court faced a problem which was fully within its province, i.e., 
a problem of statutory construction. A court is better prepared 
than an administrative agency to define the boundaries of a 
statute within which an agency may make rules. In Nor-Am, 
however, the issue was the fairness of the application of con-
cededly sound legislation. The application gave rise to questions 
which under the FIFRA should have been resolved by the 
agency.76 Since the district court intervened before the agency 
had completed its course of statutorily prescribed action, the 
Nor-Am court, unlike the Court in Abbott, had no claim to 
jurisdiction. 
The second distinction overlooked by the court was that 
Nor-Am involved a disruption of administrative processes, while 
Abbott did not. No administrative processes had ever been 
actuated in the latter case. The FIFRA directs the agency, on 
announcing its suspension order, to promptly afford the regis-
trant referral to an expert advisory committee and access to an 
expedited hearing. 77 This administrative procedure, and the con-
gressional intent that gave rise to it, were thwarted however, 
by the court's intervention in Nor-Am. Justice Fortas recog-
nized such a possibility in his dissent in Abbott: "Experience dic-
tates ... that it can hardly be hoped that some federal judge 
somewhere will not be moved as the Court is here, by the cries 
of anguish and distress of those regulated, to grant a disruptive 
injunction."78 
The court in Nor-Am implies two similarities between that 
case and Abbott, but they are not well founded. Borrowing lan-
guage from Abbott, the court regarded the impact of the Nor-Am 
suspension order to have been so "sufficiently direct and imme-
diate" as to make judicial review "appropriate."79 The choice 
facing the plaintiffs in both cases was compliance or the risk of 
criminal prosecution. However, the court fails to note that the 
Supreme Court in Abbott was dealing with yet a third criterion 
besides "directness" and "immediacy" in its measurement of 
appropriateness, and that criterion was duration. The character 
of the regulations in Abbott was permanent rather than tempor-
ary, and this non-interim quality made the regulations more 
susceptible to a finding of "finality" than the Secretary's order 
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in Nor-Am. Since the FIFRA orders are subject to expedited 
administrative hearings, they have a more tentative property. 
The court in Nor-Am also finds special significance in the 
Abbott test of pragmatism. 80 The test is used to determine the 
time at which judicial review is appropriate, and it directs the 
court's attention to the practical consequences of an agency's 
action, e.g., the economic loss to the plaintiffs. In formulating the 
standard the Abbott Court was attempting to fix the meaning of 
the word "final," as it is used in the AP A. 81 The Court had re-
ceived no assistance from the FFDCA 82 in defining finality, and 
the APA itself offered little help. 83 Although the court in Nor-Am 
could also have received only minimal aid from the APA, the 
FIFRA, unlike the FFDCA in Abbott, did supply meaningful 
guidance on the subject of finality.84 As discussed above, the 
FIFRA provisions strongly suggest that the Congress did not 
intend suspension orders to be treated as final agency action. The 
Nor-Am court should have carefully balanced such congressional 
intent against the Abbott theory of pragmatism. 
While Abbott lends no support to the decision in Nor-Am, the 
case of Ewing u. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. 85 actually militates 
against it. Ewing, like Abbott, involved the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act. 86 A provision of the FFDCA permitted the 
administrator to make multiple seizures of misbranded articles 
when he had "probable cause to believe from facts found, without 
hearing ... that the labeling of the misbranded article ... 
would be in a material respect misleading to the injury or damage 
of the purchaser or consumer."87 In accordance with that pro-
vision, Administrator Ewing ordered eleven seizures of the 
plaintiff's vitamin product. No claim was made that the product 
was actually dangerous to health. 88 Within a span of four months, 
Ewing also instituted eleven libel suits. 89 Plaintiff brought suit 
in federal district count,9° seeking to have the multiple-seizure 
provision of the statute ruled unconstitutional and to have all 
the libel suits, except the first, dismissed. Ultimately the United 
States Supreme Court91 ruled for Ewing. The Court found that 
the determination "of probable cause ... [had] no effect in and 
of itself"92; and it refused to review so preliminary a step.93 The 
response of the Nor-Am court to Ewing was merely conclusory. 
It stated that, unlike the imminent hazard finding in Nor-Am, 
the probable cause finding in Ewing was not final agency action;94 
it suggested that the reason for the Nor-Am order's finality was 
tha t plain tiffs had suffered a profi t loss.95 
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The parallels between the two cases are significant. In Ewing, 
the Court was confronted with a probable cause determination, 
made without hearing and resulting in seizure of the contested 
product; in Nor-Am the court was confronted with an imminent 
hazard determination made without hearing and resulting in 
suspension of distribution of the contested product. In each case, 
the relevant statute clearly permitted the agency action without 
prior administrative hearing. 96 And in each case the elementary 
socio-economic conflict involved an assured profit loss to private 
business and a mere possibility of some form of damage to the 
public. 
For determining finality of agency action, the concept of 
"imminent hazard" in Nor-Am can be equated to that of "prob-
able cause" in Ewing. The administrative finding in each case is 
tentative and non-conclusive. "Imminent hazard" is not de-
scriptive of a misfortune already visited upon a community; it 
is instead a term of foreboding. If the administrator were re-
quired to support his discretionary decisions with extensive 
evidence, in many cases he would have to await catastrophe be-
fore taking action. In such instances it would be more accurate 
to characterize his action as remedial rather than preventive, 
and, therefore, not in keeping with an objective of the FIFRA.97 
It is submitted then that as the term refers to anticipation, rather 
than realization, of harm, it is expected that inferences will be 
made and discretion be freely utilized. Decisions on "imminent 
hazard" consequently issue from the same logical process as 
decisions on "probable cause."98 
The majority in Nor-Am, however, reasoned that because 
business interests had been seriously affected, the finding of 
imminent hazard was final rather than tentative. The court 
noted that the FIFRA provision on "imminent hazard" had 
been copied from the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 99 
According to the legislative history of the Drug Amendments of 
1962, "imminent hazard" refers to a public health emergency.IOO 
The court relied on a report by Senator Eastland which warned 
that administrative response to alleged emergencies could have 
harsh effects upon the manufacturer's business and upon public 
confidence in the drug involved.lol He cautioned against all but 
the most careful exercise of administrative power to restrict sale 
of drugs. lo2 The Senator's report thus reveals concern for condi-
tions which, from a court's viewpoint, might signify that an order 
was final and thus merited judicial review. However, there is 
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language in the House of Representatives Report on the FFDCA 
amendments which expresses another sentiment.103 It is there 
stated that the Department must notify the manufacturer 
of its decision to suspend and to permit him to contest it either 
before or after the suspension is actually invoked.lo4 The House 
thereby indicates that the results of an "imminent hazard" 
finding are not final, and can be evaluated within the adminis-
trative framework. Perhaps even more significant to the Nor-Am 
case, however, is the fact that Eastland report is not completely 
transferable from the drug con text to the fungicide con text. 
If an assumption is made that a drug and a fungicide are equally 
hazardous to the public health, it might be reasonable to keep 
the drug on the market but to remove the fungicide. The justifi-
cation of such a decision would be that the drug, despite its 
dangers, might offer immediate and momentous benefits to the 
public health, while the corresponding benefits of the fungicide 
would be only to the economy of the farming community. The 
services of the fungicide to the public health would be more re-
mote. This distinction was overlooked by the court in Nor-Am, 
when it tried to extend the applicability of the Eastland report 
to the area of fungicides. 
Turning to the basic socio-economic conflict mentioned above, 
one may conclude that the Ewing results should apply a fortiori 
to Nor-Am. The profit loss in Ewing was probably more precipi-
tate than that in Nor-Am, since Ewing had involved seizure and 
Nor-Am had involved only prevention of continued distribution. 
Moreover, Ewing was decided in the absence of specific allega-
tions·of danger to the public health.lo5 The unadorned fact that 
the misbranding was statutorily proscribed was sufficient for the 
Court. It can be argued that the Department's action in Nor-Am 
was therefore more justified. It not only possessed the same 
measure of statutory authority that was at work in Ewing, but 
complemented this with an even greater measure of policy sup-
port. Unlike the Administrator in Ewing, the Secretary in Nor-
Am could support his position with reference to possible danger 
to public health. 
Particularly apposite to the Nor-Am case are the following re-
marks made by the Ewing court, and cited with approval by the 
dissent in Nor-Am: 
The purpose of the ... provision is plain. It is to arrest the distribu-
tion of an article that is dangerous, or whose labeling is fraudulent or 
misleading, pending a determination of the issue of adulteration or 
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misbranding. The public therefore has a stake in the jurisdictional 
issue before us. If the District Court can step in, stay the institution 
of [suspensions], and bring the administrative regulation to a halt 
until it hears the case, the public will be denied the speedy protection 
which Congress provided by [suspension] .... What we do today 
determines the jurisdiction of the District Court in all cases in that 
category. If the court in the present case can halt all [suspensions] 
but one, so can the court in other cases. The means which Congress 
provided to protect consumers against the injurious consequences of 
protracted proceedings would then be seriously impaired. Congress 
weighed the potential injury to the public from misbranded articles 
against the injury to the purveyor of the article from a temporary 
interference with its distribution and decided in favor of the speedy, 
preventive device of [suspension]. We would impair or destroy the 
effectiveness of that device if we sanctioned the interference which a 
grant of jurisdiction to the District Court would entail,106 
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin107 provides an in-
teresting comparison to Nor-Am and offers further insight into 
the workings of the FIFRA. Plaintiff conservation groups, acting 
under the FIFRA, petitioned the Secretary of Agriculture for 
issuance of cancellation notices on all products containing DDT, 
as well as for suspension of registration of those products pending 
the results of the cancellation proceedings. As regards four uses 
of DDT, the Secretary issued notices of cancellation.los He 
sought further counsel on the remaining uses and took no action 
with respect to the suspension orders. lo9 Plaintiffs then filed with 
the Court of Appeals, D. C. Circuit,110 requesting that the Secre-
tary be forced to comply with their petition. The court held that 
because delay allegedly inflicted irreparable injury, the Secre-
tary's inaction was tan tamoun t to refusal of the petitions and 
the matter was ripe for judicial review.111 The court then re-
manded the case to the Secretary for an explanation of his 
"silent but effective refusal to suspend the registration of DDT" 
or for a "fresh determination on the question of suspension."m 
The Secretary was given thirty days to comply.ll3 
There are important distinctions between EDF and Nor-Am. 
In Nor-Am the Secretary had resorted to the use of his suspension 
authority, and the plaintiffs were attempting to have that action 
undone. In EDF, however, the Secretary had come to no con-
clusion at all on the matter of suspension, and the plaintiffs were 
seeking an order in the nature of mandamus. Another difference 
between the two cases is that in Nor-Am, the plaintiffs were the 
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seller and manufacturer of a suspended economic poison, while 
in EDF the plaintiffs were conservation groups representing the 
public interest. Thus one group of plaintiffs protested on the 
basis of economic considerations, while the other argued on 
grounds of ecology and public health and safety.1l4 
What is of particular interest is the way in which the above 
distinctions affect considerations of the timeliness of judicial re-
view. Although this article disagrees with the holding of Nor-Am, 
it approves of the holding announced in EDF. A review of 
subsection 4cl16 of the FIFRA reveals that the special adminis-
trative avenues available to a registrant plaintiff on suspension 
are not available to a plaintiff who is not a registrant. Moreover, 
the judicial review provisions of subsection 4d116 seem similarly 
inapplicable to the non-registrant. The latter subsection makes 
judicial review accessible to "any person ... adversely affected 
by any order issued under this section" (emphasis added),ll7 thus 
presupposing the existence of a given order. The FIFRA then 
does not appear to specify any recourse for a plaintiff who seeks 
to have an order issued. Because of this statutory silence, it 
would seem permissible to analyze such a plaintiff's rights in the 
pragmatic manner advised by Abbott,11s Only when the plaintiff is 
a registrant, as in Nor-Am, does the FIFRA evidence a congres-
sional intent contrary to such an analysis. 
The facts of EDF also direct attention to a possible danger in 
wholly endorsing the dissenting rationale of Nor-Am. The dis-
sen t had declared: 
Included in the concept of the "finality" of an agency order is the 
requirement that the administrative process be completed and re-
course to administrative remedies exhausted as a precondition to recourse 
to judicial relief. (Emphasis added.)l19 
This theory could be partially reconciled with the EDF decision 
if the agency's inaction could be characterized as a de facto 
completion of the administrative process. However, if exhaustion 
is to be uniformly required, the danger exists that in cases similar 
to EDF, plain tiffs will be forced to press their original peti tion 
over an extended period of time. Even though the AP A places 
a theoretical limit on any such time period,120 non-adherence to 
the exhaustion doctrine may be advisable in cases like EDF, in 
which administrators refuse to act on petitions in behalf of the 
public interest. 
It is submitted that, as a general policy consideration, the 
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nature of the damages at stake should have a bearing on the 
court's determination of appropriateness of judicial review. The 
point is illustrated by another comparison of Nor-Am and EDF. 
In Nor-Am the plaintiffs were subject to finite and short range 
economic damages in the forms of profit curtailment and possible 
penalties. l21 As a result, the court found the issues before it ripe 
for review. Administrative processes were short-circuited, thereby 
defying congressional intent, and considerations of public well-
being were subordinated. In contrast, the EDF court showed a 
willingness to let economic interests be impaired. It forced a 
reluctant administrator to make a decision which would affect 
the economic interests of the manufacturers of DDT. In remand-
ing the case to the Secretary, however, it also evinced respect for 
the role of the administrative agencies. The court further demon-
strated a sensitivity to the possibilities of incalculable and even 
unrecoverable ecological loss by compelling the Secretary to fully 
justify his eventual course of action. The two courts then reveal 
contrasting general philosophies, and it is posed that the philoso-
phy of the EDF court is preferable.122 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the court in Nor-Am erred 
in holding that judicial intercession was timely. The court ig-
nored the legislative history of the 1964 FIFRA Amendments. 
Congress in those amendments intended to create administrative 
procedures which were to be completed prior to judicial review. 
The reasoning of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,123 on which the 
court heavily depended, is not applicable to the facts in Nor-Am. 
Unlike Abbott, Nor-Am did not involve a statute which clearly 
permitted judicial review at the time of the petitioners' com-
plaint; it did not involve a pre-enforcement examination of the 
administrator's power; and it did not avoid disruption of ad-
ministrative processes. The court in Nor-Am failed to reconcile 
its decision with that reached in Ewing v. Mytinger and Cassel-
berry, Inc.,124 where the United States Supreme Court refused to 
hold that a probable cause determination, rendered without 
prior agency hearing and accompanied by seizures of the pro-
ducts in question, was ripe for judicial review. It is submitted 
that the imminent hazard finding and suspension order in Nor-
Am were not effectively different from the probable cause finding 
and seizure order in Ewing. Finally, the court in Nor-Am mis-
takenly assumed that its decision was supported by the holding 
in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin. l2O EDF dealt 
with non-registrant plaintiffs, to whom, as a class, the special 
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administrative recourses of FIFRA, are not available. Thus, un-
like Nor-Am, the only means by which the plaintiffs in EDF 
could assert their rights was to appeal to a court in equity. 
Since the time of the Nor-Am decision, the FIFRA has come 
under the control of the Environmental Protection Agency.126 
The statute is therefore no longer the tool of an administrator 
whose primary task is to serve the farming community. Rather 
it has oecome the resource of an agency whose announced pur-
pose127 is to attend to ecological stability and public safety. It 
can be anticipated then that the suspension provision128 of the 
statute will be more frequently applied and more frequently 
litigated. It is submitted that the provision, as it now reads, 
adequately protects the public and requires no further amend-
ment. It is hoped that the Nor-Am court's significant error in 
dealing with the suspension provision will be recognized and not 
followed in later decisions. 
If future controversies involve agency decisions which are 
totally arbitrary and capricious, the courts can use inherent 
equity powers in order to effect relief for injured parties. Yet it 
should be noted that equity obtains only when there is no other 
adequate remedy at law, and taking Nor-Am as an illustration, 
it could be argued that the judicial machinery is not so speedy 
as to render the expedited administrative recourse inadequate.129 
It is only in recent years that the nation has been stirred to a 
consciousness of environmentally related health abuses. As a re-
sult of this new awareness and concern, the nation has influenced 
its Congress and executive branch to produce laws and policies130 
which evidence a realignment of national priorities. The ensuing 
enforcement, however, which heretofore has been only scant, can 
be significantly thwarted by courts disinclined to seize the de-
veloping knowledge and values reflected in the statutes. The 
court in Nor-Am was presented with no simple problem. Its 
principal error lay in slighting the larger policy considerations 
at work in that problem. 
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